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Mark A. Jamison 
University of Florida 
 
Abstract 
 
I examine the effects of market concentration on connectivity in network industries.  
Using Cournot interactions for a duopoly, each network chooses quantity, quality for 
communications within the provider’s own network (internal quality), and quality for 
communications between the provider’s network and other networks (external quality).  I 
find that large networks choose higher internal quality than do small networks and large 
networks choose higher internal quality than external quality.  I also find that providers 
prefer flexible technologies that allow them to simultaneously choose outputs and 
qualities.  Small networks prefer higher external quality than internal quality except when 
they make credible quality commitments before choosing output and have higher 
marginal operating costs than large networks.  Networks choose identical external quality 
unless they have exogenously determined customer bases. 
 
1 
1.  Introduction 
 
 
The liberalization of telecommunications markets has been marked by a number 
of mergers and alliances, some of which have been record setting. Examples of large 
mergers include the merger of Bell Atlantic with NYNEX in 1997, and then with GTE in 
2000 to form Verizon; SBC's acquisition of Pacific Telesis in 1997, Southern New 
England Telephone in 1998, and Ameritech in 1999; WorldCom’s purchase of MCI in 
1998; Vodafone's acquisition of AirTouch in 1999 and Mannesmann in 2000; and the 
merger of AOL and Time Warner in 2001.  The financial downturn in 
telecommunications in the early 2000s slowed the merger trend and resulted in some 
divestitures, but competition regulators, utility regulators, and continue to raise concerns 
that market dominance and mergers might hinder competition.  Concerned with market 
dominance in the Internet, the European Union (EU) required MCI and WorldCom to 
divest a portion of their Internet business as a condition of approving WorldCom's 
purchase of MCI (Crémer et al., 2000, and Ungerer, 2000) and halted WorldCom’s 
planned purchase of Sprint.  As a precondition for approving the AOL Timer Warner 
merger, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required AOL Time 
Warner to open its cable systems to competitor Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and to 
interconnect its Instant Messaging software with that of rivals before introducing 
advanced Instant Messaging-based services on its cable systems.1 
Recent economic research has focused on incentives of larger network operators 
to discriminate against smaller rivals with respect to the quality of connectivity between 
                                                          
1
 The FCC did allow AOL Time Warner the opportunity to obtain relief from the Instant-Messaging 
requirement by showing clear and convincing evidence that the requirement no longer served the public 
interest. 
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networks.  Crémer et al. (2000) find that larger Internet backbone networks have an 
incentive to lower the quality of their interconnection with smaller rivals.  Foros and 
Hansen (2001) find conditions under which two rival Internet Service Providers over 
invest in compatibility to avoid competitive pressure when they compete a-la Hotelling.  
Cambini and Valletti (2003) find that operators have an incentive to under invest in 
quality when network quality has an impact on the number of calls.  Ennis (2003) finds 
that when customers receive decreasing marginal utility from additional users on the 
network, then smaller networks derive more value from interconnection than do larger 
networks. 
This paper extends this research by examining how market concentration and 
technology choices affect network quality.  I examine a duopoly in which customers 
initially form expectations regarding network quality and size, then firms simultaneously 
choose either a flexible technology that makes it uneconomical to make quality 
commitments prior to choosing outputs, or a rigid technology that has the opposite effect.  
Previous models of network quality have assumed that firms make credible commitments 
for quality before choosing output.  This sequence is probably appropriate for networks 
of fax machines and computer components, where hardware design determines 
compatibility with rivals’ products.  However, software determines interconnection 
quality in Instant Messaging and in some aspects of the Internet.  Firms’ network 
maintenance choices and circuit choices2 also determine interconnection quality in the 
Internet.  Firms can change these quality choices while providing output.  As a result of 
                                                          
2
 Physical telecommunications networks interconnect through physical circuits.  Variations in the quality of 
manufacturer equipment can cause circuits to vary in the quality of their transmission of 
telecommunications signals.  A firm can discriminate against rivals by choosing to interconnect using 
circuits that provide below-average transmission quality. 
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this possibility, I assume that firms can choose technologies that determine whether the 
firm’s make credible quality commitments before choosing outputs. 
If firms choose the flexible technology, then they simultaneously choose output, 
network quality for internal communications (which I call internal quality), and 
interconnection quality for communications between networks (which I call external 
quality).  Otherwise, firms choose qualities and then output.  Lastly, customers choose 
their network providers.3 
To examine how market concentration affects firms’ incentives to provide quality, 
I consider two sources of asymmetry in network size.  Following Crémer et al. (2000), I 
consider models where networks have exogenously determined existing customer bases 
of different sizes at the start of the game and that these existing customers’ purchasing 
decisions do not change during the game.  I also consider models where the firms have 
different marginal production costs.  I find that differences in existing customer bases 
cause the large firm to prefer a lower external quality than the small firm when the two 
firms interconnect their networks.  Networks optimally choose identical external qualities 
when differences in network size result from differences in marginal production costs.  I 
also find that the small network prefers an internal quality that is lower than both the 
large network’s preferred internal quality.  Except when the small network makes a 
credible quality commitment before choosing output, the small network prefers an 
internal quality that is lower than its preferred external quality. 
                                                          
3
 I limit my analysis to situations where equilibria exist by considering only customer expectations of 
output and quality that are equal to actual output and quality in equilibrium.  (Katz and Shapiro, 1985)  I 
also limit my analysis to stable equilibria by considering equilibria where the demand curve intersects 
firms’ marginal costs curves from above.  (Rohlfs, 1974) 
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The analysis proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the basic model.  Section 3 
presents situations where the firms can make credible quality commitments before 
choosing outputs.  Section 4 presents the case in which quality and output are determined 
simultaneously.  Section 5 is the conclusion.  Proofs and details on simulations are in the 
Appendix. 
 
2.  The Model 
 
2.1. Demand and Supply 
 
I consider an extension of the model developed by Katz and Shapiro (1985) and 
Crémer et al. (2000) in which customers initially form expectations about network size 
and quality.  Each firm then chooses either the flexible or rigid technology.  Next the 
firms play a quality and quantity game and determine prices taking customer expectations 
as given.  Lastly customers choose network providers based on prices and the value 
customers place on network services.  The firms’ technology choices in the second stage 
determine whether each firm chooses quality and output sequentially or simultaneously.  
I assume that each firm can choose one of two technologies: a flexible technology that 
makes it uneconomical to make quality commitments and a rigid technology that does the 
opposite.  For simplicity, I assume that a firm incurs a fixed cost Γ for choosing the 
flexible technology.   Condition 1 establishes conditions under which firm i would choose 
the rigid technology. 
Condition 1.  The fixed cost of choosing the flexible technology is greater than the 
difference between the profit the firm receives when it simultaneously chooses 
quality and output and the profit the firm receives when it chooses quality before 
choosing output.  That is to say, ** iseqisimi ππ −>Γ , where 
*i
simπ  is i’s profit from 
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simultaneously choosing its optimal quality and output and *iseqπ  is i’s profit when it 
chooses its optimal quality before choosing output. 
Lemma 1.  When Condition 1 holds for firm i, firm i optimally chooses the rigid 
technology. 
A revealed preferences analysis is sufficient to confirm Lemma 1.  Firm i is 
always able to make the same choices in a game where quality and output are chosen 
simultaneously as in a game where quality and output are chosen sequentially.  
Therefore, i’s profits are at least has great in a simultaneous move game as in a sequential 
move game.  Consequently, firm i will choose the rigid technology only if it is less costly 
than the flexible technology by an amount that is greater in absolute value than the 
difference between firm i’s profits in a simultaneous move game and those in a sequential 
move game. 
There are up to three markets for the network service and two firms, L and S.  
Markets are distinct because they are separated by geography and customers cannot 
migrate across markets to purchase the network service.  There are Qm customers in 
market m, m = 1, 2, 3.  Network providers compete for customers in a single period.  
0≥imq  will denote the number of customers that firm i serves in the market. 
A customer of type [ ]mττ ,0∈  in market m obtains a net surplus from buying from 
firm i at price imp  equal to imim ps −+τ , where 
i
ms  denotes the value that the customer 
places on i’s network.  I assume that τ is uniformly distributed.  Customers desire to 
communicate with customers in all markets, so ims  is given by 
 ∑∑
= =
=
S
Lj
n
jjii
m qvs
1
,
µ
µθ . (1) 
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I let ( )vv ,0∈  represent a parameter that reflects the constant marginal value that 
customers place on network communications of a given quality.  This linearity 
assumption of value follows Crémer et al. (2000) and implies that, except for the firms' 
quality choices, each customer of type τ is indifferent with respect to which customers 
the τ-type customer communicates.   
I assume that firms can choose to “interconnect” their networks.4  In the setting of 
physical communications networks, this interconnection would be the lines and technical 
arrangements that allow customers to communicate.  In the setting of virtual networks, 
such as computer software, this interconnection could be interpreted as features that 
allow customers to benefit from exchanging information with other customers.  For 
example, a software provider may create features that allow its spreadsheet users to 
exchange data with customers that use a rival’s spreadsheet. 
Let ],0[, θθ ∈ii  represent i’s quality choice for communications between its 
customers and let ],0[, θθ ∈ji  represent firm i’s quality choice for external connectivity 
between its network and j’s network, for j ≠ i.  Quality includes such things as capacity 
for customers of physical networks to exchange messages, and features, such as with 
instant messaging.  A choice of zero represents a refusal to interconnect.  Network quality 
is perfectly observable to firms and customers alike.5 
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 In some industries, regulators require firms to interconnect their networks.  Regulated telecommunications 
is an example of a network industry where regulators require interconnection.  The Internet is generally 
unregulated.  Refusal to interconnect is rare in the Internet, but controversy over type of interconnection is 
common.  See Kende (2000) for an excellent overview. 
5
 Technically, the term iqµ  in (1) should be 1−iqµ  because customers do not obtain value from accessing 
themselves.  I suppress the –1 and assume that q is sufficiently large that it does not affect the results.  If 
the –1 were included, its effect would be to lower each firm's internal quality relative to external quality. 
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For simplicity, I assume that each firm chooses a single internal quality and that 
two firms have a single external quality for interconnecting with each other.  I consider 
situations where only one quality choice can prevail for each network interconnection.  
For example, if one firm chose a capacity of 45 megabits per second and the other chose 
a capacity of 30 megabits per second, only 30 megabits per second of information could 
be passed between the networks. Following Crémer et al. (2000) and Ennis (2003), I 
assume that if firms prefer different external qualities that they engage in Nash 
bargaining to agree upon a single quality.  (Nash, 1950; Lopomo and Ok, 2001) 
Lemma 2.  Given the assumptions of the model, each customer of type τ is indifferent 
between networks at equilibrium, i.e., jm
j
m
i
m
i
m psps −+=−+ ττ  for every i, j = L, S 
and i ≠ j. 
It follows from Lemma 2 that if firm i attracts customers, it has a quality-adjusted 
price 
 m
i
m
i
m psp ≡− . (2) 
I define the marginal customer to be the customer that, in equilibrium, is indifferent 
between buying and not buying network service.  Such a customer exists because I 
assume that [ ]mττ ,0∈ , costs are strictly positive, and v, the constant marginal value of 
connectivity, is sufficiently large relative to firms' costs to ensure that 0>imq  for every 
firm and sufficiently small to ensure that some customer 0≥τ  does not purchase.  At 
equilibrium, the marginal customer will receive zero net surplus and so will have a value 
of mp=τ .  Because the distribution of customers is uniform, the quantity of customers 
that firms choose to serve in equilibrium is simply the total number of customers that lie 
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between the upper bound of customer preferences and mp .  Normalizing the density of 
customers to 1 in each market, the quantity of customers served in market m is 
 mm
S
Li
i
m pq −=∑
=
τ . (3) 
Combining (1), (2), and (3) gives the customers’ inverse demand curve for firm i in 
market m 
 ( )∑∑
==
++−=
S
Lj
j
m
jji
S
Lj
j
mm
i
m qvqp βθτ ,  (4) 
where jβ  is the number of customers that purchase from j in markets other than m. 
I examine situations where L optimally chooses to provide a larger network than S 
optimally chooses.  This might be the situation if the firms exogenously serve multiple 
markets and L has a larger customer base than does S in these markets, or if L has lower 
marginal production costs than S for every Sm
L
m qq = .  For simplicity, I model settings in 
which L and S serve multiple markets by assuming that the number of customers served 
in these markets is exogenous and that SL ββ > .  Also for simplicity, I assume the firms 
serve a single market m when the firms have asymmetric marginal production costs and 
are symmetric in all other parameters. 
Costs for production are separable from costs for quality.  I normalize fixed costs 
to zero (except for the cost of choosing the flexible technology) and assume a constant 
marginal cost ci > 0 of production.  For simplicity, there are no economies of scope 
across markets.  ( ) jiii ggi eeG ,, θθ +≡θ  represents firm i’s cost function for quality, which 
is increasing in quality and convex. For simplicity, I assume that quality costs are 
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independent of the number of customers.  The assumption simplifies notation and does 
not affect results. 
Each firm takes its rivals’ quality and output choices as given when it chooses its 
own quality and output levels.  Firm i’s profit maximization problem can be written as: 
 
( ) ( )
[ ] { }
.0
,for,0tosubject
max
,
3
1,
i
≥
=∈
−−=∑
=
i
ji
ii
m
i
m
ii
m
i
q
q
SLj
Gqcp
i
θθ
π θ
θ
 (5) 
 
2.2  Welfare 
The surplus a customer receives from purchasing depends on the innate value the 
customer places on the network service, on the internal and external quality choices of 
the customer's network supplier, and the total number of customers who purchase the 
network services.  In each market, a customer only purchases if he values the service at 
least as much as the marginal customer does.  Recalling that utility and imp  are zero for 
customers that do not purchase from firm i, integrating over all customers who purchase 
and summing over all firms and all markets gives the net consumer surplus: 
 ( ) ( )( )∑ ∑ ∫
= =




−−≡
S
Li
i
m
q
m
i
m
i
m
i
m
i
m
net Tqdqp,quU
m3
1 0
ˆ,,,ˆ θθ qq , 
and weighted social welfare: 
 ( ) ( )∑
=
+−+≡
3
1
1
i
iinet TUZ παα , 
where α = [0, 1] is the weight given to net consumer surplus and iT  is a transfer payment 
from consumers to firm i that may be necessary to ensure non-negative profits, for 
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example.  If a social planner chooses q and θ to maximize weighted social welfare 
subject to a non-negative profit constraint for firms, she would: (i) equate the sum of the 
marginal consumer surplus and the positive network externality to the marginal 
production cost; and (ii) equate the marginal consumer surplus from quality and the 
marginal cost of quality. 
 
3.  Sequential Quality and Output Choices 
 
 
In this section I consider situations where Condition 1 holds for both firms so that 
they make credible quality commitments before choosing output.6  I first examine the 
situation where the large firm, L, has an existing customer base Lβ  and S has an existing 
customer base Sβ , where SL ββ > .  I then consider the situation where the large firm has 
lower marginal production costs than the small firm. 
 
3.1.  Asymmetric Existing Customer Bases in the Sequential Move Setting 
 
Crémer et al. (2000) show that the large firm prefers a lower external quality than 
does the smaller firm when SL ββ > , so I simply state this result as Lemma 3. 
Lemma 3.  When Condition 1 holds for both firms and SL ββ > , then firm S prefers a 
higher external quality than does firm L. 
Proposition 1 provides this subsection’s primary result. 
Proposition 1.  In the sequential choice setting with exogenous and asymmetric customer 
bases: 
                                                          
6
 Future extensions will consider situations where one firm chooses the flexible technology and the other 
chooses the rigid technology. 
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a. The large firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is greater than 
either firm’s preferred external quality and that is greater than the small firm’s 
optimal internal quality; and 
b. The small firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is lower than 
either firm’s preferred external quality. 
That is to say, *,*,*,*, SSSLLSLL θθθθ >>> .  
My model does not solve analytically, so I demonstrate Proposition 1 using a 
simulation.  Figure 1 shows the results of the simulation and the Appendix describes the 
calculations.  The vertical axis in Figure 1 represents quality preferences and the 
horizontal axis represents relative network size, namely S
m
L
m
q
q
.  When the firms have 
symmetric outputs, i.e., Sm
L
m qq = , the firms make symmetric quality choices.  As S
m
L
m
q
q
 
increases, firm L increases its internal quality and decreases its external quality 
preferences.  Firm S decreases its internal quality and increases its external quality 
preferences.  Firm L’s internal quality choice is always greater than its preferred external 
quality because higher external quality would lead its rival to increase its output, which 
would result in a lower market clearing price.  Similarly, firm L’s internal quality choice 
is always greater than firm S’s preferred external quality.  Firm L’s optimal internal 
quality is greater than firm S’s optimal internal quality because the marginal benefit to a 
customer of increasing quality is increasing in the number of customers with whom this 
customer can communicate at the higher quality, i.e., a customer values communicating 
with L’s customers more than communicating with S’s customers. 
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Figure 1. Effects of Relative Network Size on Quality 
Preferences, Sequential Move
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Lastly, firm S’s internal quality choice is greater than its preferred external quality 
when S
m
L
m
S
m
L
m
q
q
q
q
ˆ
ˆ
*
*
<  and lower than its preferred external quality when the reverse is 
true.  This crossover results from asymmetries in network size affecting firms’ internal 
and external quality preferences differently.  An increase in S
m
L
m
q
q
 implies an increase in 
the value of interconnection for the small firm all other things being equal, which leads 
the small firm to prefer a higher external quality than when S
m
L
m
q
q
 is higher.  However, 
an increase in S
m
L
m
q
q
 also implies a decrease in the value of internal quality for the small 
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network’s customers relative to the value of external quality.  S
m
L
m
q
q
ˆ
ˆ
 represents the point 
where these effects on S’s quality choices result in identical selections. 
Proposition 1 adds to the results of previous research on network quality in the 
following manner.  Crémer et al. (2000) and others have concluded that larger networks 
degrade interconnection quality with smaller networks.  If it is appropriate to characterize 
this difference in external quality preferences as degradation in quality, then Proposition 
1 shows that S degrades its internal quality relative to all other quality choices in the 
model. 
 
3.2.  Asymmetric Marginal Production Costs in the Sequential Move Setting 
 
In this subsection I consider situations where Condition 1 holds and L has lower 
marginal production costs than S, i.e., LS cc > .  Firms are identical in all other 
parameters.  Proposition 2 provides this subsection’s primary results. 
Proposition 2.  In the sequential choice setting with asymmetric marginal production 
costs: 
a. The large firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is greater than 
either firm’s preferred external quality and that is greater than the small firm’s 
optimal internal quality; 
b. The firms optimally choose identical external qualities that are lower than 
the small firm’s optimal internal quality. 
That is to say, *,*,*,*, SSSLSSLL θθθθ =>> .  
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My model does not solve analytically, so I demonstrate Proposition 2 using a 
simulation.  The Appendix provides the details and results of the simulation.  When the 
firms have symmetric outputs, i.e., Sm
L
m qq = , the firms make symmetric quality choices.  
As S
m
L
m
q
q
 increases, firm L increases its internal quality and S decreases its internal 
quality preferences in accordance with the greater (conversely, lower) value that 
customers place on connectivity with their respective networks. 
In choosing external quality, each firm considers its expected network size, the 
expected size of the rival network, and v, the value a customer places on communicating 
with another customer.  Each firm considers its own network size because this determines 
the number of customers that are willing to pay prices that reflect the value of the 
external quality.  Each firm considers the other firm’s network size because more 
customers on other networks increase the value of the interconnection.  This symmetry in 
factors that determine quality leads the firms to choose symmetric external qualities.  The 
large firm does not strategically degrade the quality of its interconnection with its rival. 
Proposition 2 contributes to the literature on network connectivity by showing 
that the source of customers affects whether firms disagree on external quality.  If some 
customers are exogenous, then firms have different external quality preferences because 
the large firm is unwilling to invest in quality for its exogenous customers to be able to 
communicate with the small firm’s customers.  However, the small firm is willing to 
invest in quality for its endogenous customers to be able to communicate with the large 
firm’s customers.  Thus the asymmetry in the number of exogenous customers drives an 
asymmetry in preferences for external quality. 
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4.  Simultaneous Quality and Output Choices 
 
In this section I consider situations where Condition 1 does not hold so that firms 
cannot make credible quality commitments before choosing output.  I first consider the 
situation where the firms have existing customer bases such that SL ββ > .  I then consider 
the situation where L has lower marginal production costs than S, i.e., LS cc > . 
 
4.1.  Asymmetric Existing Customer Bases in the Simultaneous Move Setting 
 
In this subsection I consider the situation where Condition 1 holds and SL ββ > .  
Firms are identical in all other parameters.  Proposition 3 provides this subsection’s 
primary result. 
Proposition 3.  In the simultaneous choice setting with asymmetric customer bases: 
a. The large firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is greater than 
either firm’s preferred external quality and that is greater than the small firm’s 
optimal internal quality; and 
b. The small firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is lower than 
either firm’s preferred external quality. 
That is to say, *,*,*,*, SSSLLSLL θθθθ >>> .  
My model does not solve analytically, so I demonstrate Proposition 3 using a 
simulation.  Figure 2 charts the results of the simulation and the Appendix describes the 
calculations.  The vertical axis in Figure 2 represents quality preferences and the 
horizontal axis represents relative network size.  When the firms have symmetric outputs, 
i.e., Sm
L
m qq = , the firms make symmetric quality choices and their internal quality choices 
are equal to their external quality choices.  An increase in S
m
L
m
q
q
 implies an increase in 
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L’s optimal internal quality, a decrease in L’s preferred external quality, a decrease in S’s 
optimal internal quality, and an increase in S’s preferred external quality.  Firm L’s 
internal quality choice is greater than its preferred external quality whenever SL ββ >  
because customers value access to LLmq β+  customers more than they value access to the 
smaller number of customers, SSmq β+ .  Similarly, firm L’s optimal internal quality is 
greater than firm S’s preferred internal and external qualities because L’s customers have 
more internal customer communication links than S’s customers have external or internal 
customer links, i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )SSmSmLLmSmLLmLm qqqqqq βββ +>+>+ , which makes quality more 
profitable.  It follows from the previous statement that S prefers a higher external quality 
than internal quality. 
 
Figure 2. Effects of Relative Network Size on Quality 
Preferences, Simultaneous Move with Exogenous Customer 
Base
Qu
ali
ty
 P
re
fe
re
n
ce
s
Relative Network Size, qL/qS
LL,θ
LS ,θ
SL,θ
SS ,θ
1
 
    
17 
 
4.2.  Asymmetric Marginal Production Costs in the Simultaneous Move Setting 
 
 
In this subsection I consider situations where Condition 1 does not hold and L has 
lower marginal production costs than S, i.e., LS cc > .  Firms are identical in all other 
parameters.  Proposition 4 provides this subsection’s primary results. 
Proposition 4.  In the simultaneous choice setting with asymmetric marginal production 
costs: 
a. The large firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is greater than 
either firm’s preferred external quality and that is greater than the small firm’s 
optimal internal quality; 
b. The small firm’s optimal internal quality is lower than its preferred 
external quality; and 
c. The two firms choose identical external qualities. 
That is to say, *,*,*,*, SSSLLSLL θθθθ >=> .  
As I described for Proposition 2, in choosing external quality, each firm considers 
its network size, the size of the rival network, and v, the value a customer places on 
communicating with another customer, i.e., ( )**1*, jmimji qvqK ⋅= −θθ .  Because 
( )**1*, jmimji qvqK ⋅= −θθ  is the same for both firms, they choose symmetric external 
qualities.  Furthermore, each firm determines internal quality based on v and its output 
choice squared, i.e., ( ) = − 2*1*, imii qvKθθ .  The output choice is squared because more 
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customers on the firm's own network increase the value of the network, and each 
customer represents someone who will pay a price that reflects that value. 
The large firm provides the highest quality because its optimal output is higher 
than its rival’s optimal output.  This higher output makes the large firm’s network more 
valuable to customers than its rival’s network.  Furthermore, for connection to a network 
of a given size, the large firm’s higher output makes quality more profitable for it than for 
its rival.  The rival optimally chooses an internal quality that is lower than the quality of 
its interconnections with the large firm because connection with the large firm’s network 
provides more value to the small firm’s customers than does its own network. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper, I examine incentives for quality in network connectivity.  I find that 
when firms have exogenous customers, the large network prefers a lower external quality 
than does the small network.  Otherwise, large and small networks agree on external 
quality.  I also find in all situations that I model that the large network optimally chooses 
an internal quality that is higher than either firm’s preferred external quality.  The small 
network’s optimal internal quality is lower than either firm’s preferred external quality 
except when the firms choose the rigid technology and the firms have asymmetric 
marginal production costs. 
My results extend the results of earlier research by identifying conditions under 
which a large network and small network would agree on external quality.  This raises 
questions about past US and EU regulators’ restrictions on mergers.  According to my 
analysis, a large firm would provide its own customers with higher quality connectivity 
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than it would provide its smaller rival, but the large firm's interconnection quality choice 
would be no different in a game with only endogenous output than the small network’s 
interconnection quality choice for connecting with the large firm.  Furthermore, the 
interconnection quality the large firm would choose for connecting with the small firm 
would be higher than the quality the smaller firm would choose for its internal 
connectivity. 
In this analysis I do not model situations in which one firm chooses flexible 
technology and the other chooses rigid technology.  Nor do I explicitly model mergers.  
These extensions will be addressed in future research. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.  From (5), the first order conditions for an internal solution 
include: 
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From (A2) and (A3), *,*, SLLS θθ =  because the outputs are identical.  From (A1) and 
(A2), *,*, SLLL θθ >  because SmLm qq > .  From (A3) and (A4), 
*
,
*
, SSLS θθ >  because 
S
m
L
m qq > .  This confirms Proposition 4.  
 
Specifications for Simulations 
Using (5), I approximate quality preferences using the FindRoot function in 
Mathematica.  This function relies on versions of Newton’s method for finding numerical 
solutions to systems of simultaneous equations that cannot be solved analytically.  In 
sequential games, I use backwards induction to express optimal outputs in terms of 
parameters and quality choices.  I then use FindRoot to find numerical solutions for 
quality preferences.  In simultaneous move games, I solve for outputs and qualities 
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together using FindRoot.  Table A1 shows results for the simulation for Proposition 1 
based on exogenous customer bases.  For this simulation, I used parameter values 
100=mτ , v = 0.1, c = 0, and g = 6.  Table A2 shows the results of the simulation for 
Proposition 2, for which I used the parameter values 100=mτ , v = 0.1, and g = 7.  Table 
A3 shows the results of the simulation for Proposition 3, for which I used the parameter 
values 100=mτ , v = 0.1, c = 0, and g = 6.  Simulations with other parameter values do 
not change results, so I only report simulations with the parameters specified above. 
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Table A1. Results of Simulation for Proposition 1.
L,L L,S S,L S,S
50 50 0.7393 0.7220 0.7220 0.7393
51 49 0.7410 0.7201 0.7238 0.7375
52 48 0.7428 0.7182 0.7257 0.7358
53 47 0.7445 0.7163 0.7275 0.7340
54 46 0.7461 0.7144 0.7293 0.7322
55 45 0.7478 0.7124 0.7311 0.7303
56 44 0.7495 0.7104 0.7328 0.7285
57 43 0.7511 0.7084 0.7345 0.7266
58 42 0.7528 0.7064 0.7363 0.7247
59 41 0.7544 0.7043 0.7380 0.7228
60 40 0.7560 0.7023 0.7396 0.7209
61 39 0.7576 0.7001 0.7413 0.7190
62 38 0.7591 0.6980 0.7430 0.7170
63 37 0.7607 0.6958 0.7446 0.7150
64 36 0.7623 0.6936 0.7462 0.7130
65 35 0.7638 0.6914 0.7478 0.7110
66 34 0.7653 0.6892 0.7494 0.7089
67 33 0.7668 0.6869 0.7510 0.7068
68 32 0.7683 0.6846 0.7525 0.7047
69 31 0.7698 0.6822 0.7541 0.7026
70 30 0.7713 0.6798 0.7556 0.7004
71 29 0.7728 0.6774 0.7571 0.6982
72 28 0.7742 0.6750 0.7586 0.6960
73 27 0.7757 0.6725 0.7601 0.6938
74 26 0.7771 0.6699 0.7616 0.6915
75 25 0.7785 0.6674 0.7631 0.6892
76 24 0.7800 0.6648 0.7645 0.6868
77 23 0.7814 0.6621 0.7660 0.6845
78 22 0.7828 0.6594 0.7674 0.6821
79 21 0.7841 0.6567 0.7688 0.6796
80 20 0.7855 0.6539 0.7702 0.6772
81 19 0.7869 0.6510 0.7716 0.6747
82 18 0.7882 0.6482 0.7730 0.6721
83 17 0.7896 0.6452 0.7743 0.6696
84 16 0.7909 0.6422 0.7757 0.6669
85 15 0.7923 0.6392 0.7771 0.6643
86 14 0.7936 0.6361 0.7784 0.6616
87 13 0.7949 0.6329 0.7797 0.6588
88 12 0.7962 0.6297 0.7810 0.6560
89 11 0.7975 0.6264 0.7823 0.6532
90 10 0.7988 0.6230 0.7836 0.6503
91 9 0.8001 0.6196 0.7849 0.6474
92 8 0.8014 0.6161 0.7862 0.6444
93 7 0.8027 0.6125 0.7875 0.6414
94 6 0.8039 0.6088 0.7887 0.6383
95 5 0.8052 0.6051 0.7900 0.6351
96 4 0.8064 0.6012 0.7912 0.6319
97 3 0.8077 0.5973 0.7925 0.6286
98 2 0.8089 0.5933 0.7937 0.6253
99 1 0.8101 0.5892 0.7949 0.6219
Quality PreferencesLβ Sβ
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c1 c2 L,L L,S S,L S,S
0.150 0.150 0.481794 0.449724 0.449724 0.481794
0.148 0.152 0.481812 0.449724 0.449724 0.481776
0.146 0.154 0.481831 0.449724 0.449724 0.481757
0.144 0.156 0.481849 0.449724 0.449724 0.481739
0.142 0.158 0.481867 0.449724 0.449724 0.481721
0.140 0.160 0.481886 0.449724 0.449724 0.481702
0.138 0.162 0.481904 0.449724 0.449724 0.481684
0.136 0.164 0.481922 0.449724 0.449724 0.481666
0.134 0.166 0.481941 0.449724 0.449724 0.481647
0.132 0.168 0.481959 0.449724 0.449724 0.481629
0.130 0.170 0.481977 0.449724 0.449724 0.481610
0.128 0.172 0.481996 0.449724 0.449724 0.481592
0.126 0.174 0.482014 0.449724 0.449724 0.481574
0.124 0.176 0.482032 0.449724 0.449724 0.481555
0.122 0.178 0.482051 0.449724 0.449724 0.481537
0.120 0.180 0.482069 0.449723 0.449723 0.481519
0.118 0.182 0.482087 0.449723 0.449723 0.481500
0.116 0.184 0.482106 0.449723 0.449723 0.481482
0.114 0.186 0.482124 0.449723 0.449723 0.481463
0.112 0.188 0.482142 0.449723 0.449723 0.481445
0.110 0.190 0.482161 0.449723 0.449723 0.481427
0.108 0.192 0.482179 0.449723 0.449723 0.481408
0.106 0.194 0.482197 0.449723 0.449723 0.481390
0.104 0.196 0.482216 0.449723 0.449723 0.481372
0.102 0.198 0.482234 0.449723 0.449723 0.481353
0.100 0.200 0.482252 0.449723 0.449723 0.481335
0.098 0.202 0.482271 0.449723 0.449723 0.481316
0.096 0.204 0.482289 0.449723 0.449723 0.481298
0.094 0.206 0.482307 0.449723 0.449723 0.481280
0.092 0.208 0.482326 0.449723 0.449723 0.481261
0.090 0.210 0.482344 0.449723 0.449723 0.481243
0.088 0.212 0.482362 0.449723 0.449723 0.481225
0.086 0.214 0.482381 0.449723 0.449723 0.481206
0.084 0.216 0.482399 0.449723 0.449723 0.481188
0.082 0.218 0.482417 0.449723 0.449723 0.481169
0.080 0.220 0.482436 0.449723 0.449723 0.481151
0.078 0.222 0.482454 0.449723 0.449723 0.481133
0.076 0.224 0.482472 0.449723 0.449723 0.481114
0.074 0.226 0.482491 0.449723 0.449723 0.481096
0.072 0.228 0.482509 0.449723 0.449723 0.481077
0.070 0.230 0.482527 0.449723 0.449723 0.481059
0.068 0.232 0.482545 0.449723 0.449723 0.481041
0.066 0.234 0.482564 0.449723 0.449723 0.481022
0.064 0.236 0.482582 0.449723 0.449723 0.481004
0.062 0.238 0.482600 0.449722 0.449722 0.480985
0.060 0.240 0.482619 0.449722 0.449722 0.480967
0.058 0.242 0.482637 0.449722 0.449722 0.480949
0.056 0.244 0.482655 0.449722 0.449722 0.480930
0.054 0.246 0.482674 0.449722 0.449722 0.480912
Quality PreferencesMarginal Costs
Table A2. Results of Simulation for Proposition 2.
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L,L L,S S,L S,S
50 50 0.6709 0.6709 0.6709 0.6709
51 49 0.6728 0.6690 0.6728 0.6689
52 48 0.6747 0.6671 0.6746 0.6670
53 47 0.6766 0.6652 0.6764 0.6650
54 46 0.6785 0.6632 0.6782 0.6629
55 45 0.6804 0.6613 0.6800 0.6609
56 44 0.6822 0.6593 0.6818 0.6588
57 43 0.6840 0.6573 0.6835 0.6567
58 42 0.6858 0.6552 0.6852 0.6546
59 41 0.6876 0.6531 0.6869 0.6525
60 40 0.6894 0.6511 0.6886 0.6503
61 39 0.6911 0.6489 0.6903 0.6481
62 38 0.6929 0.6468 0.6919 0.6459
63 37 0.6946 0.6446 0.6936 0.6436
64 36 0.6963 0.6424 0.6952 0.6413
65 35 0.6980 0.6402 0.6968 0.6390
66 34 0.6996 0.6379 0.6984 0.6367
67 33 0.7013 0.6356 0.7000 0.6343
68 32 0.7029 0.6333 0.7015 0.6319
69 31 0.7045 0.6309 0.7031 0.6294
70 30 0.7062 0.6285 0.7046 0.6269
71 29 0.7078 0.6261 0.7061 0.6244
72 28 0.7093 0.6236 0.7076 0.6219
73 27 0.7109 0.6211 0.7091 0.6193
74 26 0.7125 0.6185 0.7106 0.6167
75 25 0.7140 0.6159 0.7121 0.6140
76 24 0.7156 0.6133 0.7135 0.6113
77 23 0.7171 0.6106 0.7150 0.6085
78 22 0.7186 0.6079 0.7164 0.6057
79 21 0.7201 0.6051 0.7178 0.6028
80 20 0.7216 0.6023 0.7192 0.5999
81 19 0.7231 0.5995 0.7206 0.5970
82 18 0.7245 0.5965 0.7220 0.5940
83 17 0.7260 0.5936 0.7234 0.5909
84 16 0.7274 0.5905 0.7247 0.5878
85 15 0.7289 0.5875 0.7261 0.5847
86 14 0.7303 0.5843 0.7274 0.5814
87 13 0.7317 0.5811 0.7287 0.5781
88 12 0.7331 0.5779 0.7300 0.5748
89 11 0.7345 0.5745 0.7313 0.5714
90 10 0.7359 0.5711 0.7326 0.5679
91 9 0.7373 0.5677 0.7339 0.5643
92 8 0.7387 0.5641 0.7352 0.5606
93 7 0.7400 0.5605 0.7365 0.5569
94 6 0.7414 0.5568 0.7377 0.5531
95 5 0.7427 0.5530 0.7390 0.5492
96 4 0.7441 0.5491 0.7402 0.5452
97 3 0.7454 0.5451 0.7414 0.5411
98 2 0.7467 0.5410 0.7426 0.5369
99 1 0.7480 0.5368 0.7438 0.5326
Quality Preferences
Table A3. Results of Simulation for Proposition 3.
Lβ Sβ
